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1 Introduction 
First, I thank the information system (IS) scholars who took the time to respond to my paper. They provide 
sparkling, varied, deep, and challenging responses, and I greatly appreciate them. I hope that the whole 
debate will open up renewed interest in progressing IS research and creating new directions and theories 
as we experience the unprecedented extent of change and technological disruption in businesses driven by 
the requirement for digital transformation and the rise of technologies such as big data, cloud computing, 
and the Internet of things. I also thank Professor Kautz for his work in editing and managing this debate. 
My motivation for my outburst and for catalyzing this debate came from my frustration at the way I perceive 
IS research as moving towards a convergence on a particular philosophical approach. This approach adopts 
the experimental methods of material studies to investigate human-based systems. I was also moved by 
my own experience of reviews of my work that referred to a need for “scientific conversation”, for “scientific 
commentary”, and to be ‘more scientific’ as if claiming to be scientific somehow offers a validity to IS 
research that it may otherwise lack. The pursing of such “scientific” validity has not only driven an increase 
in the frequency with which researchers use statistical surveys and techniques such as structural equation 
modeling but also influenced case study research, which has increased the frequency with which 
researchers use statistical techniques to prove conclusions drawn from case studies. 
In my paper, I suggest that certain studies (which TAM studies exemplify) dominate IS research: that is, 
primarily positivist studies that give preference to statistical, mathematical, and reductionist methods. I 
examine some recent studies to illustrate that this dominance often results in superficial conclusions with 
limited practical relevance. I argue that science, which I take to mean the procedural approaches 
researchers use and the conclusions they draw in natural science about which I am familiar due to my 
training as a microbiologist, cannot apply to information systems. Liu et al (2016) suggest stem cell research 
and psycho-physiology as discipline equivalent to IS research. These comparisons are not appropriate. IS 
research focuses on the connection and influence between technological artefacts and humans and on their 
entanglements. It stands alongside anthropology, economics, politics, and sociology. It focuses on studying 
humans and organizations more than the raw bits and bytes of the technology. 
Giddens (1993) considers the view that sociology should resemble natural sciences to be naïve. Sociology 
has moved beyond this positivist perspective. However, this positivist naivety pervades IS research. 
Sociology is scientific in the sense that it is systematic, involves obtaining and analyzing data, and develops 
logical theory. But it is not a physical science, and the scientific method of natural sciences cannot apply. 
Indeed, Giddens (1993, p. 11) states: “Human beings are self-aware beings, who confer sense and purpose 
on what they do”. 
I suggest that a kind of social atomism drives much IS research, and I refer to the work of the philosopher 
Alasdair MacIntyre to critique a fetish of numbers. I highlight the importance of narrative and, in search of a 
more appropriate analogous discipline. I identify dance studies, a relatively new discipline that, like 
information systems, has had difficulty defining and locating itself and, like information systems, has 
interdisciplinary characteristics in drawing on a wide range of source disciplines. 
In summary, I argue that the IS discipline has lost its way: IS is not a natural science. The predominance of 
positivism should be challenged and new interpretive approaches developed. In Sections 2 to 6, I address 
each rejoinder in turn. 
2 The Positivist Extremism and Reproducibility 
Dennis, Valacich, and Brown (2018) take the strong view that one can fundamentally predict and replicate 
studies on information systems. They claim that qualitative and narrative approaches represent an important 
component of research and yet implicitly exclude them by championing replication. They put methodological 
extremists in their sights for mistaking a seed of truth as the only truth and yet their entire research 
philosophy relies on the presence of one approach, one truth. 
Dennis et al. (2018) present an incorrect analogy. If one can reduce a piece of music to a score, then one 
can presumably present an information system to a set of machine code instructions. Representing a piece 
of music as a score simply serves as a tool to support the complex set of activities. Notation is not 
knowledge. To even understand a score of Corelli’s Christmas Concerto requires one to have varied 
knowledge and experience: reading music, playing, harmony, orchestrating and performing. Even still, 
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someone with such knowledge would still produce a poor performance if they did not also understand the 
history and context of its writing and early performances.  
Dennis et al. (2018) reduce information systems to artefacts that represent a series of coded statements. 
Their statement that “knowledge is to practice as a musical score is to music” (p. 212) shows a debatable 
understanding of what knowledge is. Does one create an information system? Or does one create a 
technical artefact that supports the flow of information, enables human purposeful activity, and is an 
embedded or entangled element of an information system? Having stated an unbreakable connection of 
knowledge with practice, they contradict themselves when they state that they strive for knowledge that is 
disconnected from current practice. 
Dennis et al. (2018) counter my comments about the relevance of much IS research by referring to the 
invention of the mouse. However, inventing a physical artefact such as a mouse categorically differs from 
identifying some behavioral aspect of a social system. The mouse represents a completely creative and 
different way of interacting with a computer and served as a paradigm change in computer practice. 
Conversely, much IS research (e.g., TAM research) offers nothing new and rather states the obvious. 
Dennis et al. (2018) claim to be critical realists. Perhaps they have nostalgia for the reassurance of 
positivism that suggests that, if one cannot see and measure something, it does not exist and one should 
not consider it. When this approach collapsed in the 1970s and 1980s, researchers pursued post-positivist 
approaches. In fact, critical realism does not exist as a coherent unified viewpoint. As the American 
Sociological Association (2016) notes: “Critical realism is not an empirical program; it is not a methodology; 
it is not even truly a theory, because it explains nothing”. Social scientists operate with a set of beliefs and 
values. No less do information systems scholars. And we should all care about making our philosophical 
positions clear. Our representations of the world always have a historical perspective, and the fact that 
Dennis et al. cast themselves as critical realists should preclude them from relying in any way on the 
scientific method or predictable laws. As the American Sociological Association (2016) states: 
Critical realism can shed light on the methodological issues that have plagued social science 
since the beginning—problems such as studying unique events or small numbers of cases, and 
the logic of comparison. Such insights provide a warrant for a historical sociology that uses small-
N case comparative analysis to reconstruct the complex, contingent, and conjuncture nature of 
causality and to overcome the problem of incommensurability between historical events, while 
resisting the search for constant conjunctions. 
If Dennis et al. (2018) were critical realists, they would abandon the illusion of replicability. I would suggest 
that Dennis et al. are crypto-positivists: they try to hammer a mixed discipline into the shape of hard 
computer science and mathematics. I would note also that I did not suggest that qualitative research 
represents the only way or preferred way of doing research. My statement on the primacy of narrative refers 
to the fact that narrative underpins all research and that narrative forms a part of any research activity and 
any research output. 
Dennis et al. (2018) also take the step of undermining the concept of science in stating that “all research 
methods are seriously flawed” (p. 213). Referring to Popper (1959), I argue that the scientific method, 
scientific reductionism, has proved itself over the centuries and produced the technological advances we 
have today. The field of application, not the method, has flaws. Science works in a set of limits. It can answer 
some questions but not others. The flaw lies in how we understand humans and society and, hence, apply 
inappropriate methods to social phenomena. 
At the heart of Dennis et al.’s (2018) argument may not lie a debate about the relative value of quantitative 
and qualitative approaches but rather an underpinning metaphysical debate about how we understand the 
material world and the nature of humans, which leads to the following questions to continue the debate: 
what “scientific” justification do you use to reproduce IS studies located in organizations? How would you 
define knowledge? In what way do prediction and generalizability clash with realism?  
3 The Ethics and Credibility of Information Systems 
Gregor (2018) suggests that placing information systems in the constellation of humanities would constitute 
a dangerous threat to society and may lead to unethical behavior. Her argument suggests that scientific 
research in information systems will lead to ethical principles concerning issues such as usability heuristics. 
Usability rules are not ethical rules. The development of standards and whether people follow them share 
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little connection. The issue lies not in the technical aspects of usability and system testing but in the social 
systems, the organizational pressures, and the power issues in the organizations.  
Gregor (2018) pivots her arguments around the definitions of information systems and sciences. Both terms 
which, as I state above, I assumed researchers generally agreed on. Her arguments concerning the 
definition of information systems draw on a definition of information systems research and a reference to 
curriculum. 
She rightly identifies that IS addresses not just the technical or social but the confluence of both. But the 
technical and social do not exist side by side. Rather, they are entangled. The technical artefacts mediate 
or support the social systems. Without the organization—the human activity—the technical becomes an 
abandoned husk. The study of information systems does not dwell on how the technical fits together or even 
the technical design processes: it dwells on the human and organizational process that the technology 
attempts to model and underpin. 
Even if we accept a model of IS research as concerning the interface between the technical and the social, 
social issues represent the prime issues that face organizations today. Information systems drive human 
interaction, and IS studies should focus on the people and organizations. Indeed, IS research has a need 
to highlight the systems and holistic aspect.  
Gregor’s (2018) second witness is the IS curriculum as per Topi et al. (2010). If we consult this curriculum, 
we find that it takes a very narrow view of information systems in that it focuses on developing the artefact. 
Her quote from the outcomes notably primarily addresses social and organizational processes: processes, 
requirements, evaluation, sourcing, and risks. Artefacts dominate her view of information systems. 
The disciplines Gregor (2018) cites (medicine, architecture, and engineering) are disciplines of the material. 
They are hard disciplines. Core medicine deals with chemical systems—the material. Replacing a hip 
constitutes an engineering exercise that requires precision and material understanding. A patient’s attitudes, 
beliefs, values, behavior, purposes, and so on do not pertain to the medical science. Information systems 
focus on facilitating human behavior and cooperation, to enable the development of social structure as we 
see in social computing, to develop business processes, to mediate contracts and ways of running society. 
Information systems differs from computing, computer sciences, or software engineering. It deals with 
human entanglements, human consequences, and the impact that humans have on computer systems. I 
feel that Gregor inadequately portrays information systems in this respect. 
In addressing what science is, I clearly equated science with the application of the scientific method, which 
I illustrated with the laboratory experiments I conducted as a graduate student. I am happy to hear that 
some scholars have begun to question the dominance of positivism in information systems and 
acknowledge TAM’s dominance. I do not suggest that researchers should never use quantitative techniques 
in IS research. 
Gregor (2018) resorts to distracting attention from the core understanding of the scientific method, a method 
which much information systems research purports to apply, by discussing “creditability”: Science concerns 
creditability rather than an expectation that laws hold universally, and fact finding must be reproducible. But 
her argument neither addresses the chasm between what scientific method is and the social nature of 
information systems study nor does she consider who decides what is creditable. Credibility is purely socially 
defined. What is credible to one social group or one organization may be entirely incredible to another and 
involves little objective foundation. Credibility of even a scientific hypothesis depends on social networks 
and particular views (Latour, 1987). Neither does variety indicate strong science. 
Reproducibility lies at the center of science and the scientific approach. Whether a step in the Krebs cycle, 
a trolley running down a slope, or the quantum physics slits experiment, science intrinsically focuses on 
achieving the same result every time. However, one cannot do so when considering what impact an 
information system has in an organization or even student subjects in an experiment. People differ: they 
behave differently every day. 
Realizing this fact, Gregor (2018) appeals to Herbert Simon and the science of the artificial. Simon 
essentially focused on demonstrating that one could reduce all social phenomena to hard scientific 
measurement. Gregor conflates the hard engineering measure that might apply to internal combustion 
engines with the soft measure of attitude and values. Simon (1962) considers social systems as the same 
as molecular systems. 
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I would point out that information has never caused an action. It is inert. Information requires actors who 
interpret their environment, who select and decide what is important, and who encode it as messages. It 
requires a physical actor who takes that information and applies a further layer of interpretation in order to 
act on it and change the physical environment. Actors may encode that interpretation into an algorithm such 
that the machine acts on the human’s behalf. While the machine may act as a proxy actor, it still operates 
on an algorithm that represents the programmer’s interpretation and understanding of a social and human 
environment originally created. 
Gregor’s (2018) perception of science does not relate back to the development of scientific method under 
the likes of Newton and Copernicus. Rather, it descends from the enlightenment and the thoughts of Comte 
who thought that one could find laws in social phenomena the same as laws of gravity and motion. Comte 
applies the concept of positivism to social studies. The enlightenment tore apart the connections that existed 
for thousands of years across a variety of disciplines and scholarships and declared that all that exists is 
material. However, philosophers have since found the positivism of Combe and A. J. Ayer wanting and now 
dismiss it. Hence, we require new critical and interpretive approaches. 
Rather than pursuing a disciplinary model such as dance studies that offers a variety of lenses, approaches, 
and points of view, I argue that pursuing the science of the artificial in information systems creates 
pseudoscience and unethical practice. One cannot detach information systems from their organizational 
environment. Moreover, design must address the organizational, social, and political issues that impinge on 
the information systems. Design constitutes a much wider aspect than just good human-computer interfaces 
and ease of use. Controlled experiments with information systems provide little usefulness in seeking to 
understand a complex social phenomenon. 
Gregor (2018) points out that we need to distinguish scientific endeavors from pseudoscience and non-
science. But what is pseudoscience? According to the Cambridge dictionary, it refers to ‘a system of thought 
or theory that is not formed in a scientific way’ (“Pseudo-science”, 2018). Of course, that definition leads 
one to ask what constitutes the “scientific way”. Gregor uses the example of pharmaceutical clinical trials 
as the type of the scientific way. She further suggests that controlled experiments give important information 
about what works and what does not.  
Hence, we need to ask: can one conduct such controlled experiments in information systems research? 
And, if such experiments constitute science, can one scientifically conduct information system research? 
Controlled experiments require uniformity in subjects such that the control group and the test group are 
homogenous. They require directly measurable (dependent and independent) variables such as drug 
amount for body weight and blood pressure or serotonin level. They require a bounded unchanging 
environment. If other things vary, such as level of stress or amount of food eaten, one must account for 
them. However, one can rarely apply directly measurable variables to information system phenomena. 
Indeed, no direct way to count or measure the variables may exist. We create proxy variables, which may 
not provide illuminating counts or measures of the variables they supposedly quantify (Nelson, 2016).  
Many measurables are entirely subjective. For example, in studying online waiting, Chen, Lee, and Hwang 
(Forthcoming) created a proxy variable called perceived enjoyment that they measured with items that 
required the participant to describe activities as pleasant, fun, interesting, and enjoyable. It seems to me 
that this variable can hardly stand in as a scientific variable equivalent to temperature or oxygen 
concentration. It is subjective and may vary according to a participant’s temperament, behavior, and state 
of mind. I suspect many information systems laboratory studies are equally subjective and cannot be 
described as scientific.  
Furthermore, since information system usage occurs as part of human purposeful activity and occurs in a 
complex social environment, not in a classroom laboratory, any experiment strips out the complexity to such 
an extent as to render any connection with the real world questionable. Beyond very constrained 
psychometric experiments such as testing user interfaces, which resides in the realm of usability 
engineering rather than information systems, claiming that a controlled experiment actually represents a 
real-world social phenomenon is not scientific. The impact of an information system lies in power structures. 
How it distributes power and resources in an organization, how it translates the interest of one human to 
another, and how it mediates and changes human relationships. The power of an information system lies in 
its political manipulation—in its use to make people behave in a different way, to attach specific meaning to 
people’s identities through big data, to exclude and include individuals and groups. 
Thus, I instead contend that an artefact-dominated perception of information system practice and study 
actually creates the potential for unethical behavior. And, since information systems has a much greater 
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impact on people than dance, I argue that such a stance might be all the more irresponsible, which leads to 
the following questions for further debate: how artificial are information systems? Who decides what is 
credible and how? Does any sustainable relationship between controlled laboratory experiments and the 
deployment of computer applications into the social and organizational context exist? 
4 Entrepreneurial Information Systems 
Thatcher, Pu, and Pienta (2018) portray information systems research as working at the intersection of IT, 
people, and context; as dynamic, inclusive, and accepting; and as embracing diverse epistemological and 
ontological perspectives. I agree that such a portrayal represents what IS research should be. But does 
evidence show that information systems research actually conforms to such a portrayal? I initially engaged 
in this debate with inspiration from and due to the various “state of the union” IS research studies (Palvia, 
Daneshvar Kahki, Ghoshal, Uppala, & Wang, 2015; Liu et al., 2016; Stein, Galliers, & Whitley, 2016) that 
suggest quite the contrary: that IS research is static and exclusive and that the market of ideas has become 
a monopoly that successors or variations of TAM dominate. So, while we may engage in wishful thinking 
about what IS should be, we must face the reality of what it is. 
By suggesting dance studies as an analogous discipline, I do not deny an interdisciplinary foundation for 
information systems but suggest that it has an interdisciplinary and diverse core. Dance studies does not 
simply examine the act of dancing and the notation of dance. On the one hand, it must examine anatomy 
and the mechanical forces that act on a dancer and the medical effects of that and how to counter them. It 
also concerns management, economics, and the practice of dance in the community. It addresses history, 
culture, expression, and narrative. The IS discipline has a similar variety: it should include not only the 
quantitative but also interpretive studies, histories, symbolic interactionism, and autoethnography. Further, 
it should draw on theories from art history to zoology. 
In other words, I argue that information systems already focuses on a narrow methodological toolkit in which 
structural equation modeling is king and the dominant ideology is a positivist. Pick a journal, such as 
Information and Management, which purports to be the “international journal of information systems theories 
and applications”. Pick also a recent issue, such as January, 2018. What do we find? Quantitative research 
about information quality, laboratory experiments, a quantitative study of online consumer review 
communication, and statistical study after statistical study. Where is the diversity and plasticity? Through a 
mixture of fear and ideological purity, we have abandoned just the interdisciplinarity and dynamism that 
Thatcher et al. (2018) envision. 
The problem with building a cumulative tradition concerns the foundations that researchers build it on. If our 
foundation relies too much on an outdated positivism, we will unbalance the disciplinary edifice that will 
likely to collapse when its weight fractures the foundations. 
Thatcher et al. (2018) do not finish with critiquing my arguments; rather, they positively seek ways forward. 
I thoroughly support their three recommendations. Entrepreneurship requires an environment in which one 
can test new ideas, take risks, and expect failure. However, the IS discipline’s institutional norms hinder 
creativity, versatility, vision, and agility. They encourage more of the same. I think that entrepreneurs, not 
bothered by apparent feasibility, can pursue the different or the impossible. However, the tradeoffs we make 
cause IS research to stagnate. 
I would argue that IS research requires practical engagement. IS researchers should find practical 
partnerships important. It is effectively unethical to just take the data and run. We should participate in 
discussions that motivate and inform both research and practice. Here, IS researchers should become 
thought leaders and help practitioners to break out of the ruts that constant industrial and commercial 
pressures trap them in. Academics supposedly have the freedom and time to reflect and think. We also 
have the position to ask hard questions of the hype and trends that drive commercial IT practice: is there 
anything new about digital transformation? How much of blockchain’s promise is hype? 
Finally, Thatcher et al. (2018) call for IS researchers to double their efforts to address the entanglement of 
IT and social context, to pursue new insights, and to conceptualize new constructs. This direction certainly 
constitutes the right one and leads to several questions for further debate. Entrepreneurship requires risk, 
experimentation, and failure, and yet the information systems research culture and practice debilitate 
against this. Thus, how can we promote and encourage entrepreneurial scholarship? Should we just accept 
that institutional norms and commercial viability will stifle creative ideas and entrepreneurial research? Do 
tradeoffs simply mean compromise and capitulation? 
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5 Images of Science 
It is more difficult to debate with someone who you generally agree with. Alter offers a sober and structured 
critique that counters some of my paper’s rhetoric. As I note in Section 1, Alter quite rightly points out my 
lack of definitions. For example, the term “information systems” says something that one cannot easily 
define—researchers have spilt much ink in debating the nature of the IS domain because, perhaps, it is 
really an interdisciplinary rather than a distinct discipline. It draws on a network of feeder disciplines in 
addressing what are at heart practical issues concerning organizations, people, information, and 
technology. 
Alter (2018) defines both science and information systems in a way that centers on the concept of knowledge 
objects. The way he defines an information system around work systems perhaps relies too much on 
utilitarian notions seeing as it is only functional when it produces a product or service. Information systems 
are complex concepts that, like a diamond, have many facets depending on the stakeholder’s worldview. 
In reflecting on how individuals used information systems in ancient Mesopotamia, one might conclude that 
an information system an information system refers to an aggregation of people, processes, and technology 
that concentrates power via controlling resources (McBride, 2013). One working definition might be “an 
organized deployment of people, processes, and technology that mediates human relationships towards an 
agreed outcome or purpose by manipulating objects of interest through processes that conform to a 
negotiated interpretation of the real world”. 
Alter (2018) presents an interesting application of a work system snapshot to support the definition of 
science. However, in doing so, he perhaps only moves the debate from what is science to what a knowledge 
object is. A Beethoven symphony is a knowledge object. But one does not produce it via applying science. 
Neither can one study it with a scientific process that might explain it as a set of sound waves. Meaning 
requires many different lenses of study.  
Alter’s (2018) seven images of science provide a helpful framework to advance the debate. Through the 
image of searching for enduing truths, he suggests that we may identify basic ideas rather than scientific 
laws, which I would agree with. We will find patterns, and we might express some as axioms. These patterns 
in information systems would resemble the design patterns that one creates in object-oriented analysis and 
design or the systems archetypes that one identifies in systems dynamics. Researchers create such 
patterns out of their understanding. Describing patterns of behavior abstracted from social situations differs 
considerably from discovering irrefutable, reproducible, and scientifically provable laws. 
The experiment Alter (2018) discusses in the second image seems to me to reasonably apply the scientific 
method in information systems. It is well bounded and the method pertains to the domain of study. It also 
seems to involve a reasonably precise measurable: the number of erroneous user stories. I do not seek to 
eliminate positivist experiments from information systems; rather, I question the wholesale application of 
experiments, mathematical modeling, and statistical methods across entirely inappropriate areas where 
“barely noticeable effects rest on complex statistical argumentation related to inherently imprecise variables” 
(Alter, 2018, p. 180) 
Useful knowledge (third image) requires researchers to properly immerse themselves in industry and 
practice and to understand practitioners’ concerns. While no reason to avoid pursuing deep, blue skies 
theories exists, information systems is essentially a discipline of practice. Perhaps the issue is a cultural 
one: perhaps practical experience should precede academic research, and perhaps the discipline should 
discourage researchers from directly progressing from doctorate degree to academia. 
I am not against abstraction (fourth image). To survive, we must all abstract from one situation to another. 
However, many researchers disturbingly seem to abandon any responsibility for the abstraction. They 
assume that, because Cronbach’s alpha was acceptable and p = < .001, the abstraction constitutes some 
kind of scientific fact about which they have no responsibility to interpret. Unfortunately, data-driven decision 
making seems to be going the same way. Because researchers have identified certain trends in big data, 
they represent facts that one cannot question. 
As for dance (which the fifth image references), I accept that music would serve as an equally valid analogy. 
Musicology (i.e., scholarly analyses and research-based music studies) does not involve studying only 
scores or performances. It goes beyond composition and performance to history, context, issue, and 
concerns in contemporary music. Musicologists teach, manage, and administer; some even maintain 
parallel careers as professional performers or composers.  
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I wonder whether we will ever be able to fix a body of knowledge (BoK) for information systems. Agility and 
agile development approaches including DevOps form the heart of IT practice, yet we seem unable to 
incorporate them into information system syllabi (sixth image). 
I accept that my prescriptions are idiosyncratic. But I would suggest everyone’s prescriptions are. I feel that 
IS studies have neglected and insufficiently featured issues of power since Markus’s (1983) seminal paper. 
I think the obsolescing and creative destruction ideas are excellent. And I agree that the “IT artefact” has 
become obsolete. IT is highly integrated and connected: for example, the cloud, the Internet of things, big 
data, and NoSQL databases form an entangled network that practitioners refer to as the IT ecosystem. 
Indeed, we need to question whether the concept of an IT artefact has any use at all. A server, a smart 
meter, a CRM application in isolation has limited interest outside the computer science discipline. Only when 
one puts them into context do they become the subject of the IS discipline. Hence, we should focus on the 
human and social activity that generates and deploys applications into the ecosystem. 
For IS researchers, this current debate on whether IS is a science concerns culture as much as logic. We 
need more agile ways to communicate and promulgate ideas and research outcomes. Long papers that 
take years to appear only accentuate the irrelevance. We need dissemination vehicles as in the Federation 
of European Biochemical Societies (FEBS) letters that can publish short communications and conceptual 
pieces in several months rather than several years. As such, I raise the following questions for further 
debate: is the debate on what constitutes the BoK for information system pointless because one can never 
pin it down? Does the IT artefact exist? 
6 Rites of Passage 
Galliers and Stein (2018) offer some support for my argument against IS being a science by reference to 
Checkland’s philosophical analysis of the origins of systems thinking. They sketch the progression of 
information systems in which they illustrate its origin in systems thinking and, more precisely, in 
dissatisfaction with positivist approaches to information systems research that had failed to engage with 
organizations’ messy nature and the “wicked” problems in information systems. In this case, one has to ask: 
why have we not learnt from history? If we had learnt lessons—if we had pursued a balanced approach to 
information systems—we would not still be rehearsing this debate some 33 years later. 
However, what they offer is a “rites of passage” argument that, in order to get to a point where we can 
question the current direction of information systems, we must conform. We must serve our quantitative 
apprenticeship and yield to a quantitative consensus.  
The problem with applying the rites of passage idea is that institutional constraints do limit researchers. The 
rites of passages, which in research terms, Galliers and Stein (2018) identify as career transition, refer more 
to means of social conditioning. Rites of passage concern social conformance. That is, they involve 
researchers’ identifying themselves as one of a group and aligning their behavior and thinking to the 
dominant group (in this case, perhaps the dominant professors). Rites of passage ensure a continuity of 
culture and tradition. They focus on preserving ideas—on stability not change. Rites of passage discourage 
questioning. They discourage one from asking “why are we doing this?” or “does any alternative exist?”. 
Galliers and Stein (2018) advocate “breaking the rules a little”. I accept that creativity requires that we 
understand the rules and the nature of our discipline in order to extend and change it. Creativity is not wild, 
unpredictable, and chaotic (in the popular sense of the word chaotic). Rather, it has structure. It starts with 
structure and patterns and produces new structure and patterns. It has bounds and constraints. Stravinsky 
said: “I can only be creative under huge constraints”. 
However, it takes acts of courage not to progress through the tramlines of academic rites of passage but to 
put them at risk—to refuse to do the same as everybody else and to respectfully ignore the referees. The 
problem may be that, by the time we have subjected ourselves to the academic rites of passage and 
achieved tenure, we have so dulled our senses, so compromised our vision, so cauterized the imagination 
that we cannot possibly take up the creative baton. We become imparters of the received wisdom and simply 
reinforce the institutional mores and ritual. 
7 Conclusions 
I do not suggest that we abandon quantitative research. Rather, I suggest that we place it in its right 
contextual place in the constellation of research approaches. In this debate, I question the obsolete positivist 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems 225  
 
Volume 43 10.17705/1CAIS.04315 Paper 15  
 
philosophy that underpins much IS research that hankers for repeatability, reductionism, and refutability. 
However, such practice problematically provides a certainty and comfort—an assurance that the social and 
human world is predictable, containable, measurable, and controllable. Information systems are living, 
human, social systems: one cannot separate the technology from the social without killing the animal.  
MacIntyre (2007) contrasts institutions that pursue external goods with practices that pursue internal goods. 
The external goods concern money, status, and power. They concern tenure, professorial chairs, grant 
income, citations, H-indices, and impact factors. Internal goods concern intellectual achievement, the 
pleasure of ideas, excellence, and quality in outputs. There exists a constant but creative tension between 
these two goods. 
However, I note that, concerning practice (such as research practice), MacIntyre (2017, p. 190) says: 
A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rule as well as the achievement of 
goods. To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy 
of my own performance as judged by them.... Thus the standards are not themselves immune 
from criticism, but nonetheless we cannot be initiated into a practice without accepting the 
authority of the best standards realized so far. 
But, to prevent a practice from stagnating, its practitioners need to practice the virtues of humility and 
courage: in particular, the humility to stay open to other avenues of investigation in pursuing truth and the 
courage to practice critical thinking in their studies. 
Beneath the surface of a debate on research approaches, methodologies, and the nature of a discipline lies 
a deeper concern with what it means to be human and the relationship between humans, information, 
machines, and society. If we take a post-human view of humans as configurations of meat, deterministic 
machines, connected in a deterministic society, we might pursue the same scientific approach that we apply 
to carbon atoms or to the mindless forces of nature. If we take a metaphysical or even spiritual view of 
humans and society, we might be more concerned with variants of meaning with hermeneutics and 
interpretation.  
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